The Carter Doctrine: A Pivotal Moment in America’s Foreign Policy

On November 4, 1979, ninety Americans were taken hostage at the US embassy in Tehran, marking the beginning of the Iran Hostage Crisis.[1] The attack on the embassy was a product of the Iranian Revolution, which was led by students supporting Ayatollah Khomeini and resulted in the overthrow of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who had been the ruler of Iran for thirty-eight years and a long-term ally of the United States.[2] After the Shah was deposed, Khomeini seized control over the Iranian government. During the revolution, the anti-American sentiments were on the rise because of the US’ long-standing support of the Shah, and these sentiments resulted in the Iran Hostage Crisis when the US decided to grant the Shah temporary asylum.[3] The Shah had been admitted to the US to undergo medical treatment, but many Iranians accused the US of helping the Shah set up “counter-revolutionary headquarters.”[4]

The President of the US at the time, Jimmy Carter, immediately responded to the hostage crisis by trying to find a peaceful resolution to the problem. The first response tactic used diplomatic strategies such as sending envoys to negotiate with Khomeini and reaching out to the international community for support. However, these methods proved futile in securing the release of the hostages. The administration then turned to putting economic pressure on Iran by stopping the shipment of military equipment and spare parts to Iran, estimated to be worth over $300 million. After that, Carter suspended the purchase of Iranian oil by the US and froze Iranian assets in US banks. These assets were valued at about $8 billion and would have allowed Iran to cause significant economic loss in the US. However, this course of action still did not elicit a favorable response from Iran. In fact, the administration’s course of action reflected a “fundamental misperception and misunderstanding” of the motivation of the revolutionaries. Iran saw President Carter and his administration as “enemies to humanity,” rather than a force with which it was possible to make peace from a solely diplomatic standpoint.[5] This series of decisions placed the US in a less powerful position than that in which it had been before.

Just as the Iranian Hostage Crisis was beginning, another challenge rose in the Middle East. On December 24, 1979, Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan, occupying strategic locations in Kabul. The invasion came more than a year after the Saur Revolution in April 1978, when Afghanistan’s premier Sardar Mohammed Daoud was replaced by the revolutionary government of the Popular Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) under Nur Mohammed Taraki. Taraki’s government contained many pro-Soviet members. Although Taraki’s foreign policy orientation was ambiguous and he claimed that his party’s policies were reformist rather than communist, much of his platform suggested a strong communist influence. The political orientations and backgrounds of the military leaders of the coup also suggested that there was a considerable connection to the Soviet Union within the movement. Even after the Saur Revolution, tensions remained high as the PDPA’s socialist stance drew much opposition because it strayed from the traditional and religious values and customs of Afghanistan. The period between the revolution in 1978 and the invasion in 1979 was characterized by unrest and uprisings. The number of Soviet advisors in Afghanistan rose to almost four thousand by October 1978, and many of them were killed in the year before the invasion in Afghanistan.[6]

As the repression of Soviet influence continued into 1979, the Soviets backed an attempt to remove the Minister of the Interior Hafizullah Amin, who was associated with much of the resistance against the Soviet impact on the Afghan government. However, the removal attempt failed and instead Taraki was replaced by Amin as the premier of the Afghan government. Although the Soviets publicly congratulated Amin, they gave him thirty days to establish his authority or to step down for a pro-Soviet replacement. Soviet forces near the Afghan border were also put on modified alert as the Soviets became more concerned about the new government backing resistance against the Soviet presence in Kabul. Although Amin attempted to defuse the tension, he was unable to eradicate the anti-Soviet sentiments that he himself had inspired in the Afghan people and could not pacify the insurgents looking to escape Soviet power in northern Afghanistan. The situation continued to deteriorate despite Amin’s efforts and culminated in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan over Christmas of 1979.[7]

The Soviet army’s invasion of Afghanistan represented yet another threat to the US’s position in the Middle East. Instead of approaching the situation carefully and passively as he had with the Iran Hostage Crisis, Carter quickly responded to the invasion by issuing the Carter Doctrine. In the doctrine, Carter called the Persian Gulf area, including Afghanistan, an area of “vital interest” to the US which Carter vowed to protect from Soviet power. The administration was willing not only to use economic sacrifice and diplomatic strategy, but also military efforts, to restore power in the Middle East.

This approach represented a significant contrast to Carter’s original pacifist and humanitarian policies. Before the invasion, the Soviet Union was not seen “in a threatening light” as the administration considered the US to be stronger “economically, politically, morally, and militarily” than the Soviet Union and believed that the Soviet Union was not likely to be expansionist. Carter’s goal was to make the administration’s development of foreign policy more “simple and responsive” to new initiatives. He wanted to ensure that the US-Soviet relationship did not take the center stage in his policies. However, because of a “worsening international situation” and “rapidly changing domestic political climate,”[8] most of the administration’s original principles were superseded by more pressing foreign policy requirements. This transition to a more aggressive and proactive approach to foreign policy was reflected in the Carter Doctrine and in the Carter administration’s responses to these two crises in the Middle East.

Carter’s policies aimed to make the United States a leader in the international community to defend human rights and “the ideals of international peace.”[9] The base of his platform and the policies that Carter wanted to implement were strongly influenced by his belief in the importance of prioritizing human rights. Carter’s foreign policy was a reaction against the focus on Soviet-US relations during the Nixon-Kissinger administration[10] and an attempt to make foreign policy-making system more “simple and responsive” to new initiatives, especially those pertaining to human rights. His goal was first and foremost to “avoid bloodshed” in any situation.

Carter’s most fundamental values influenced the initial response to the Iran Hostage Crisis. However, abiding by these principles led the administration to a series of failures. The administration’s initial response to the hostage situation was focused on “exploring every possible way to establish communications with Khomeini and secure the hostages’ release” through sending envoys directly and leveraging international powers.[11] Immediately after the hostages were taken, Carter sent former US attorney general Ramsey Clark and William Miller to negotiate with Khomeini.[12] However, Khomeini refused to meet with Clark and Miller on November 7.[13] When the United States failed to communicate with Iran directly, the administration used international tactics in attempts to open Iran up for negotiations. The administration reached out to the Palestine Liberation Organization and sought help from them in mediating the crisis negotiations.[14] The US also tried to work with the Security Council of the United Nations, which focused international attention on the hostages. The President of the Council released a statement expressing “profound concern” over the hostage crisis. All of this attention pointed at the issue did little to diffuse the situation: it raised the tension with the press and the general public, but did not lead to any action from the Iranians.[15]

After the resounding defeat of diplomatic tactics, the United States turned to different ways of pressuring Iran economically, such as freezing Iran’s assets in the US and suspending the delivery of military equipment to Iran. First, Carter paused all shipments of military equipment and spare parts worth over $300 million to Iran. He then suspended the purchase of Iranian oil in the United States, but this was countered by Iran when they established an embargo of the sale of oil in the US. The administration then froze all Iranian assets in American banks in response to the Iranian plan to withdraw all these assets.[16] The mass withdrawal had the potential to greatly weaken not only the economy of the United States but of many First World countries and would have eliminated “the basic economic leverage” that the US had over Iran.[17] Freezing the assets thwarted the plan and prevented the economic collapse that may have followed it. Overall, economic pressure from the US raised the cost of keeping the hostages for Iran. However, this was not enough to make the Khomeini government yield; the crisis continued after the halt of economic relations between the two countries.

The Carter administration’s immediate response was characterized by a “fundamental misperception and misunderstanding” of the motivation of the revolution in Iran by the US.[18] The Khomeini government had no interest in striking a deal with the US.[19] They only sought the return of the Shah to Iran and the condemnation of the Shah’s actions, which the US was unable to grant them as Carter had already admitted the Shah on the grounds that he had to undergo medical treatment in the United States (a decision Carter would later say he regretted and made based on misinformation about the Shah’s condition). American decisions had been rooted in supporting the Shah, almost unconditionally, and avoiding contact with other Middle Eastern powers, rather than developing partnerships around the Middle East.[20] The US had always assisted governments that represented US interests in the Middle East (e.g. they supplied the Shah of Iran with arms and attempted to negotiate peace between Israel and Arabs), sometimes deprioritizing and sacrificing human rights concerns in the process. This was especially true in the case of the US’ support of the Shah’s government, where security and strategic interests were more important than the human rights violations committed by the Pahlavi regime. These included the suppression of the rights of minority ethnic groups, such as Turkish-speaking Azerbaijanis and Kurds.[21]The Shah’s dictatorship fully utilized state technology to repress the individual freedoms and rights of the Iranian people. These methods included “SAVAK,” the regime’s “coercive” intelligence service which Iranians considered to be “omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent.”[22] Freedom of speech and of the press were significantly violated and oppressed. There is no decided figure for the number of political prisoners at the time -- they range between 3,500, the “admitted” official number, and 125,000, the highest number given by leaders of the regime’s critics. Meanwhile, the US had a significant role in overthrowing the Mossadeq government, which Iranians saw as protection of political and individual freedoms and rights.

There was no reconciliation to be made between the US’ loyal support of the regime “guilty of the most flagrant violations of human rights” and Carter’s platform based around concern for human rights. From this irony sprang the anti-American sentiment that fueled the Iranian revolution and the subsequent Hostage Crisis. Nevertheless, the Shah had been one of the US’ few channels into the Middle East and the country was relying on the Shah as an anchor for American control of the Persian Gulf region, as oil from the Middle East was a cornerstone of the American economy. What Americans saw in the situation was a major blow to the national sense of dignity and strength.

The “dramatic psychological effect” of the Iran Hostage Crisis was compounded by the repeated failures of the Carter administration to resolve the situation, which seemingly extended the crisis for longer than they had expected. Americans felt vulnerable and frustrated with the state of foreign policies because American citizens were endangered in Iran and because of America’s seemingly helpless position in the international arena. Carter had emphasized that he was searching for “allied unity” and cooperation with other countries, but this proved to be a weak basis for conducting American foreign policy. Carter’s response to the Iran Hostage Crisis in November 1979 and the onset of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 proved this weakness. Americans had expected and wanted the hostage crisis to be resolved in days and weeks, not months. Carter’s approval ratings had gone up momentarily in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, incited by a brief moment of patriotic unity rallying around the President, but the boost was quickly running out.[23] The failure of the Carter administration's diplomatic approach led to a “growing concern about his ability” among the American people, shown by polls taken for the 1980 Presidential election.[24] The people’s sense of doubt and disappointment was further accentuated by the fact that the crisis was highly emotional and unprecedented for the American people and the government. Americans identified with the hostages’ loss of fundamental human dignity, a value deeply ingrained in American culture and values. It was clear that the people believed that “action was better than no action,”[25] and were therefore frustrated with the administration’s passivity and nonintervention. The failures of Carter’s initial tactics began to signal to Carter and his administration that American foreign policy needed to pivot in order to adequately respond to the new situation at hand.

In 1979, the Carter administration still seemed reluctant to act or interfere too overtly in specific situations, but shifted to be more assertive during the last year due to the developing opposition within the administration and in Congress.[26] As Carter and his advisors devised a new strategy for approaching the crisis in the Persian Gulf and the looming Soviet threat, two advisors served as Carter’s main influences: Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor Zbiegnew Brzezinski. The root of the difference between Vance and Brzezinski was in their perceptions of the importance of the Soviet Union and the way the US was supposed to deal with it.[27] Vance believed that the centerpiece of US foreign policy under Carter was the nuclear arms agreement, including the SALT II Treaty, with the Soviet Union. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks were a series of two rounds of negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union with a goal of reaching an agreement about arms control. The agreements that came out of these talks were SALT I and SALT II, the latter having been signed under Carter. Vance hoped that SALT would become the basis for more US-Soviet cooperation and would set the tone for and be the main focus of American foreign policies. On the other hand, Brzezinski believed that the nation’s best interests lay in ensuring that the Soviet Union could not become more powerful than it already was. He believed that SALT was an opportunity to “halt or reduce the momentum of the Soviet military buildup.”[28] Seizing this opportunity became even more clearly necessary after what the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. If the invasion proved not to be an isolated incident and the Soviets acted in Iran next, the aftermath could be catastrophic for the US. Brzezinski advocated for downgrading the US-Soviet relationship and instead establishing more connections with countries in the Middle East, East Asia, Africa, and Western Europe. He wanted to ensure that the US was not overly deferential to the Soviets because increasing Soviet military power was strongly interlinked with America’s diminishing assertiveness.[29] Brzezinski believed that the Soviet Union was the US’ principal challenger.[30] However, some of his views did overlap with Carter’s: both politicians saw value in pushing for policies that addressed human rights. While Carter had an idealistic vision of defending human rights around the world, Brzezinski perceived human rights as a way to put the Soviets on the defensive ideologically, exposing the Soviet Union to worldwide attention and decreasing anti-American sentiments globally.

The need for a change in the US’ foreign policy, especially policies pertaining to strategic control of the Persian Gulf, was made more urgent by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. National Security Advisor Brzezinski saw the combination of the Iran Hostage Crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as an “arc of crisis,”[31] in which the Soviet Union was challenging the US’s hold of oil-producing regions in the Middle East by attempting to incrementally take more control over those countries. Brzezinski’s view was that the American position in détente needed to be redefined. At the start of Carter’s term, Brzezinski and Carter were already concerned with the way the previous administration had allowed the USSR to exploit détente, despite the fact that Carter came to the White House without a clear US-Soviet policy strategy. Brzezinski wanted to lead the formation of this strategy in the direction of maintaining the general concept of détente, but reshaping it so that it included both competition and cooperation with the USSR. He believed that the US could not continue to simply stand on the outside and passively peer into way the USSR behaved under détente.[32]

Brzezinski’s concerns were only confirmed by the invasion of Afghanistan, which was immediately linked to the turmoil in Iran. Yet another critical region of the Middle East had fallen, and the US was dragging behind the USSR on the world stage. This decline made it clear to the Carter administration that not only was the Persian Gulf region threatening to slip out of the US’ hands, but that the Soviet Union was also leveraging this instability to work towards taking control of the region. This realization led to the reprioritization of the Soviet threat in Carter’s policies on top of managing the situation in Iran. Both Carter and Brzezinski saw this as a marker that the US needed to become even more active than previously anticipated. Carter believed that the American treatment of the Soviet Union in the context of détente needed to become more “comprehensive” and “reciprocal.” Brzezinski agreed with this direction, stating that the US was pushing for “equal treatment (retaliating in kind, if necessary)” and that the Soviet Union “could not have a free ride in some parts of the world while pursuing detente where it suited them.”[33] Brzezinski reminded Carter that “Afghanistan is the seventh state since 1975 in which communist parties have come to power with Soviet guns and tanks, with Soviet military power and assistance.”[34]

In the aftermath of the invasion, Carter was much more willing to face the fact that he needed to stray from his humanitarian ideals in order to adequately respond to this development. Carter wrote that Soviet forces were “employed to overthrow that established government [Amin’s government] and to impose a new government,”[35] in response to the Kremlin’s justification that it had to intervene on the basis of the “urgent request” of the Afghan government. The US firmly rejected these claims. Brzezinski believed that the Soviet Union was seeking to advance its efforts in gaining direct access to the Indian Ocean[36] and was concerned that Iran, which already had a complicated relationship with the US, may be the USSR’s next target. Iran’s government was less than stable as a revolution was underway, which is what made Afghanistan vulnerable to the Soviet Union in the first place. The invasion made the US-Iranian relationship even more difficult for the Carter administration because containing the spread of the Soviets’ militaristic expansion was the crucial next step. For the administration, the possibility of direct confrontation with the Soviet Union could not be excluded. All events pointed to the need for the US to emerge from the détente, a policy to which Carter had hoped to continue adhering during his Presidency, in order to resecure the US’ position as a world superpower and to protect its economic stability. If the US lost control of the Persian Gulf region, this could cause an economic collapse domestically.[37]

Carter’s approach to the invasion was heavily influenced by the recommendations of Brzezinski. In adopting Brzezinski’s policies, Carter moved from a “managerial” approach to the approach of containment and militarism in order to satisfy the right wing interests and the public opinion and to avoid political backlash.[38] Brzezinski’s strategy would show heightened aggression and strength, which the US needed to display in the face of the Soviet threat in the Middle East. Brzezinski’s approach averted the focus from the US-Soviet cooperation suggested by Vance and centered the attention on ensuring that the United States remained a powerful force on an international scale. His proposed strategy had a common ground with Carter’s desire to maintain human rights at the forefront of the US foreign policy but pushed for taking a powerful stance that was sorely needed at this juncture in US-Soviet relations. While Vance’s perspective offered a less dominant tone for interactions with the Soviets, the military threat indicated that the US needed to be a “police” figure on the world stage, which called for a step away from friendly relationships.

Carter wanted to avoid concentrating his platform entirely on Soviet relations because he believed that the US should be using its position in the world as a securer of human rights. However, the US was still a world superpower in need of maintaining its place, and the SALT talks inevitably took great precedence in foreign policy. The fact that SALT was still such a high priority under Carter demonstrates how Soviet affairs were already an inevitable target of attention for the United States in this era. The events of the last two months of 1979 further accentuated this.

The changes that the administration underwent culminated in the delivery of the Carter Doctrine during the 1980 State of the Union address. The Carter Doctrine sought to address the situation unfolding in Iran and Afghanistan and to restore the confidence of the American people in the administration by proving that Carter’s plan of action would be an adequate and effective response to the current situation. It signaled the pivot in Carter’s approach to these two crises, but it also justified his restraint in using military force, as he still believed that the US’ military strength could only be used to protect the welfare of other countries, rather than to initiate conflict as the Soviet Union had done. The Carter Doctrine was a new chapter in the way the US dealt with unrest abroad, as the administration emerged from its fundamental misunderstanding of the situation in Iran and in Afghanistan. The Carter administration’s initial response to the Iran Hostage Crisis depended on the hope that diplomacy would resolve a hostile and complex situation. The hostility of the situation was compounded by the intense and chaotic political turmoil from which the crisis had arisen. Clearly, diplomacy was not productive or appropriate for such a situation. The Khomeini government was not seeking to negotiate or compromise. The result of this misperception was that the US had not acted in a way that was productive in solving the situation, and Carter was declaring that he was turning his approach around. He made two main assertions: that protecting the Middle East was more important to the US than it (or the administration at least) had realized because of America’s economic dependence on the region and that the US was now much more willing to use military strength to restore and maintain control.

In his address, Carter characterized the Persian Gulf region as an area of “vital interest.” The United States “depend[ed]” on this vital region because of the US’ reliance on resources from the area, especially oil, to sustain the strength of the American economy. At this point, the strain that the Middle Eastern relations had placed on the economy had become concerning for the American people -- Americans who said that they disapproved of Carter’s performance in polls cited the cost of living as their main grievance. Indeed, it was the “vitality” of the region that led the administration to conclude that the US needed to take control of the Persian Gulf region to survive economically, demonstrating that the US’ fate was being held in the balance by Middle Eastern affairs. In 1979, Iran supplied 6.5% of the world’s exported oil.[39] Overall, 50% of the US’ oil came from foreign sources. Carter himself stated in his speech that Afghanistan contained “more than two-thirds of the world’s exportable oil.” If the US lost the contributions of Iran and Afghanistan to its supply of oil, the economic toll on the everyday lives of all Americans could be devastating.[40] Carter pointed directly to the problem: “excessive dependence on foreign oil is a clear and present danger to our nation’s security.”[41] Relying on the stability of this remote region made Americans uneasy and made the economy seem unstable, as it was difficult for Americans to foresee what would happen next. They also felt vulnerable as the actions of Iranian revolutionaries, who were out of the US’ control, could determine the fates of their fellow Americans. Carter wanted to make it clear that he was responding to the dissatisfaction of the American people and restoring the US’ position as an authoritative country that controlled its interests, not one that was controlled by them.

The Iran Hostage Crisis and the invasion of Afghanistan also changed the US’ attitude towards the Soviet Union, especially in the context of détente. Carter stated in his speech that, in order for the US to be secure physically and economically, it had to “face the world as it is” -- the administration had to stay committed to keeping the Soviet Union out of the Middle East, which is why the US could not remain a strong world power without maintaining a foreign policy centered around the Soviet threat. The Middle East, a region central to many Western economies including the American economy, was being strategically and aggressively taken over by the Soviet Union in an attempt to exploit Carter’s more humanitarian focus and hesitation to use military force. This signaled to the American people that Carter was seeing the events in Brzezinski’s “arc of crisis” framework, rather than treating them on a case by case basis. He wanted his audience to know that he saw these events as part of a more significant, much larger threat to US security and “peace that preserves freedom” -- the resurgence of the Soviet Union as a global military power. The dependency of the US economy on oil was making the US vulnerable to the Soviet threat, which Carter was representing as a threat to freedom itself in order to illustrate that what matters at stake were not only of economic but also of ideological and moral nature.

The major point Carter made in his doctrine was that the United States was much more willing to use military strength as a tool for retaining power over the Middle Eastern region than it had been in the earlier years of Carter’s term. However, he still wanted to set the US’ military strategy apart from the aggressive and invasive Soviet approach. Carter saw the US re-establishing itself as a world power by becoming a world policeman and protecting smaller and weaker countries from hostile forces, especially the Soviet threat. Once again, the US foreign policy was centered around ensuring that the Soviet Union did not gain footing in other regions, especially those that were of economic interest to the US. Carter’s new message for other countries was that “in our presence they are secure,” meaning that the US was a defensive force that would ensure their safety in a “resolute”[42] course of action. Here, Carter’s choice of words aims to directly contradict the criticism he received for his passive and ineffective handling of the Iran Hostage Crisis.

However, Carter still sets himself and the US apart from the Soviet Union’s use of military force by showing the US’ “restraint” in deploying military strength to gain control.[43] This is where Carter’s own values and ideals are revealed in the Carter Doctrine. Carter is portraying the Soviets as reckless and ruthless in their use of military force while justifying the US’ assertiveness in the Middle East. To restore the American people’s confidence in his judgment and his strategies, he emphasized how the US had the potential to “thrive” if the administration “remain[ed] true to our values” and “engaged in promoting world peace,” pointing out the balance between a more aggressive  strategy and Carter’s humanitarian reservations about using them. The US was not going to be using military strength in the imperialist and expansionist manner of the Soviet Union, but only as a means to protect its regions of interest from the Soviet threat. Above all, Carter continued to uphold his goal of using the US’ stature to ensure human rights around the world. Even though he still clung to keeping the US more reasonable and less violent than the USSR, he ultimately adopted Brzezinski’s policies of limiting the spread of Soviet control in the Persian Gulf instead of forging partnerships and remaining neutral.

In his article “The Afghanistan Crisis and the Carter Doctrine,” John Somerville argues that, through the Carter Doctrine, the US is establishing itself as “not only the world policeman, but the world judge and world jury,”[44] and that the essence of the doctrine holds the Soviet Union at a double standard. He claims that, while the Soviet Union is being portrayed as an outside force that is threatening the Middle East’s safety, the US is being depicted as a non-hostile force coming to the Middle East’s aid. He also suggests that the doctrine assumes that the USSR is threatening Iran, although the US is also threatening Iran with serious repercussions if they do not comply with the US’ terms and meet the US’ needs. Simultaneously, if the USSR moves into the Persian Gulf, the US would fight off the Soviets to supposedly protect the region. The US was “appointing itself controller of the Persian Gulf” to ensure that “no outside force comes in” and “no inside force, no country within the region does anything” the US regards as a threat to its own “vital interests.”[45] He also observes that the doctrine is reminiscent to the pre-détente, Cold War-era policies of Eisenhower that were rooted in ensuring that “any section of the world that is vital” to the US does not “fall into a form of government inimical” to the United States to protect its “enlightened self-interest.”[46]

While Somerville is right in pointing out the similarity between the Carter Doctrine and Eisenhower’s Doctrine and the hypocrisy of the doctrine’s approach to the USSR, the Carter Doctrine was an appropriate response to Carter’s critics, the majority of the American people, and the administration’s experience leading up to this point with the Middle East. Carter’s pivot towards a more assertive stance is an especially apt response because of the failures of Carter’s pacifistic policies in the beginning of the Iran Hostage Crisis. What the US needed at this point was for Carter to re-establish the US as the “world policeman” in order to safeguard the economic and political health of the country, even if it meant holding the Soviet Union to a double standard. The administration needed to prioritize the needs of the American people rather than the world as a whole, as Carter’s excessive focus on human rights and peaceful diplomacy failed to protect his own people from economic hardship, political strains, and a hostage situation.

Carter’s decision to return to more aggressive, Cold War-esque policies reflects how Brzezinski’s political philosophy influenced his stance. Since the US was one of the two competing superpowers, a more aggressive policy that ensured that the Middle East remained stable and the Soviet Union was not able to take control of the Persian Gulf was needed.

Conclusion:

The Carter administration’s subsequent response to the invasion of Afghanistan reflected the new doctrine Carter established in his State of the Union address. The administration decided to channel increased aid in support of the local Afghan resistance forces, called the mujahideen, which actively fought against the Soviet Union and the pro-Soviet government in Operation Cyclone. The operation used the United States’ connections to governments in the Persian Gulf region to covertly funnel financial resources to the mujahideen in hopes of bolstering local resistance to the Soviet military. The administration chose this approach in order to tap into an existing military force without having to engage directly with the Soviet Union. Although this program was expanded under the Reagan administration, Carter was responsible for establishing the pathways through which the initial aid was sent to these forces. He dropped all sanctions against Pakistan and embraced an alliance with the dictatorship despite public commitments to human rights and democracy so that the US could use the Pakistani government to set up behind-the-scenes contacts with local Afghan forces and to channel financial resources to them.[47] The US also decided to pursue a wider security arrangement by engaging all countries committed to resisting Soviet expansionism to permit the initiation of a defense arrangement. Brzezinski characterized this change as a “major historical turning point.”[48] This was more than a turning point for the administration’s policies and for Carter’s outlook towards handling the Middle East, as it also set the tone for America’s relationship with the Middle Eastern in years to come. Future presidencies would build on the model Carter had set up for supporting foreign grassroots forces in countries vital to the US’ economic and political welfare.

The rescue operation in Tehran on April 24, 1980, known as Operation Eagle Claw, was also a direct consequence of the pivot in Carter’s foreign policy. The operation was ordered by Carter in an attempt to rescue the fifty-two hostages still held in the embassy in Tehran by military means. The decision to use the military reflects a significant change in the way the administration approached the situation. In fact, a military operation had been considered in the past by the National Security Council when diplomatic relations began to break down.[49] The idea was soon struck down as the council believed the operation would be doomed to fail because of logistical challenges.[50] Carter’s initial response to the proposed military operation was framed as humanitarian: he prioritized  the hostages’ safety over all other factors and therefore refrained from using military tactics that could endanger the hostages. However, after the Carter Doctrine, the militaristic approach was brought back on the table, and the US armed forces executed Operation Eagle Claw. The fact that the operation was carried out despite all the risks serves as evidence to the fact that a major turn took place in the US foreign policy as a result of the Carter Doctrine.

Even though Operation Eagle Claw failed to rescue the hostages, the impact it made on domestic politics underscores the significance of the Carter Doctrine. In the immediate aftermath of the rescue operation, the American public responded positively to Carter's new approach even though it failed. The American people believed that it was still an indication that the US was on the right course of action for resolving the crisis. The US had responded actively and assertively to the crisis, aligning with the demands of the people. Before the rescue operation, Carter’s approval rating was at 21%, one of the lowest for any US president since 1937. After the operation, 71% of Americans stated that they believed Carter was right about launching the operation.[51] This drastic increase in public approval of the administration shows that the Carter Doctrine was well received by the American public. Operation Eagle Claw achieved the goal that the Carter Doctrine had set on an ideological level: developing a more aggressive response to give the US control over the Middle Eastern landscape.

The Carter administration’s response to the crises of 1979 and 1980 -- the Iran Hostage Crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan -- after the creation of the Carter Doctrine represents a foundational shift in the US’ attitude towards resolving tensions abroad. It also marked the US’ reprioritized goal of maintaining control over these regions as the goal of paramount importance, not only because of their significance for the US economy but also because of the USSR’s interests in these regions. Many of the tactics the Carter administration set into motion in the Middle East during Carter’s last year of presidency became the foundations of and the precedents for programs that were expanded under future presidents. Most notably, Operation Cyclone was expanded under Reagan and grew to become one of the “longest and most expensive covert CIA operations.”[52] The Operation supplied billions of dollars in arms to the mujahideen forces in Afghanistan that contributed to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1987. Although his successes may have been clouded by the challenges of his presidency, Carter’s contributions, especially in the form of the Carter Doctrine, are a momentous part of the evolution of American foreign policy.

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[1] Larson, David L. "The American Response to the Iranian Hostage Crisis: 444 Days of Decision." International Social Science Review 57, no. 4 (1982): 198-200. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41881381.

[2] Noah Tesch, "Iran Hostage Crisis," in Encyclopedia Britannica, last modified January 31, 2019, accessed May 28, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/event/Iran-hostage-crisis.

[3] Larson, "The American," 197; Tesch, "Iran Hostage Crisis.”

[4] Betty Glad, "Personality, Political and Group Process Variables in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Jimmy Carter's Handling of the Iranian Hostage," International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale De Science Politique 10, no. 1 (1989): 41, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1600729.

[5] Larson, "The American," 198.

[6] Gabriella Grasselli, British and American Responses to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996), 203-204.

[7] Grasselli, British and American, 204-205.

[8] Grasselli, British and American, 35.

[9] Grasselli, British and American, 32.

[10] Grasselli, British and American, 35.

[11] Jimmy Carter, White House Diary (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2013), 370.

[12] Carter, White House, 368.

[13] Carter, White House, 368.

[14] Betty Glad, "Personality, Political and Group Process Variables in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Jimmy Carter's Handling of the Iranian Hostage," International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale De Science Politique 10, no. 1 (1989): 37, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1600729.

[15] Larson, "The American," 198.

[16] Larson, "The American," 200.

[17] Larson, "The American," 198.

[18] Larson, "The American," 198.

[19] Glad, "Personality, Political," 38-39.

[20] Glad, "Personality, Political," 38.

[21] Alireza Nader and Robert Stewart, "Iran's Forgotten Ethnic Minorities," Foreign Policy, last modified April 3, 2013, accessed November 11, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/03/irans-forgotten-ethnic-minorities/.

[22] Richard W. Cottam, "Human Rights in Iran under the Shah," Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 12, no. 1 (Winter 1980): 127, accessed November 10, 2019, https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1913&context=jil.

[23] Barbara Zanchetta, The Transformation of American International Power in the 1970s (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 76.

[24] Glad, "Personality, Political," 46; At the beginning of the crisis, Carter’s approval rating had increased dramatically because of a sense of unity and support of the President -- a rally-around-the-flag effect. Polls for the election showed that in January 1980, 62% of voters were likely to vote for Carter. However, as the crisis dragged on, people began to question the administration’s handling of the situation. Six months later, his approval rating was down to 30%.

[25] Larson, "The American," 206.

[26] Grasselli, British and American, 48.

[27] Grasselli, British and American, 36.

[28] Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 146.

[29] Grasselli, British and American, 36.

[30] Grasselli, British and American, 37.

[31] Grasselli, British and American, 47.

[32] Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 147.

[33] Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 147.

[34] Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 75.

[35] Zanchetta, The Transformation, 285.

[36] Zanchetta, The Transformation, 285.

[37] Zanchetta, The Transformation, 286-287.

[38] Grasselli, British and American, 40.

[39] Larson, "The American," 196.

[40] Grasselli, British and American, 38.

[41] Jimmy Carter, "State of the Union," speech, January 23, 1980, The Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum, last modified June 29, 2017, accessed May 14, 2019, https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/assets/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml.

[42] Carter, "State of the Union," speech, The Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum.

[43] Carter, "State of the Union," speech, The Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum.

[44] John Somerville, "THE AFGHANISTAN CRISIS AND THE CARTER DOCTRINE," Peace Research 12, no. 3 (1980): 143, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23684999.

[45] Somerville, "THE AFGHANISTAN," 143.

[46] Somerville, "THE AFGHANISTAN," 143-144.

[47] Barbara Zanchetta, The Transformation of American International Power in the 1970s (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 287.

[48] Zanchetta, The Transformation, 287.

[49] Glad, 40.

[50] Brulé, 101.

[51] Larson, 206.

[52] Donald L. Barlett and James B. Steele, "The Oily Americans," TIME, May 19, 2003, accessed November 10, 2019, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,450997,00.html.